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Steps To Define Offenses Against
the Law of Nations
Robert A. Bloom
ROBLEMS OF definition, always important and at times deci-
sive for clarity, are triply compounded when dealing with the
concept "offenses against the law of nations." Not only is a cen-
tury to be covered, but the last quarter of it is in futuro, and at no
TnE AUTHOR (B.A., Princeton Univer-
sity, LL.B., Harvard University), Secre-
tary of the International Criminal
Law Commission of the World Peace
Through Law Center, is a practicing at-
torney in Nassau County, New York. He
has done substantial research and writing
in the area of Crimes Against Humanity
and will assist the Commission in its
contemplated publication of books and
articles on related topics.
time during its first three quar-
ters did any significant consen-
sus develop with regard to the
meaning of offenses in inter-
national law. The period
1892-1992 represents a deep-
ening in the meaning of "of-
fenses," a broadening and in-
deed a vast change. This
change has been and probably
will be so great that it could
be said that the difference in
meaning over the century has been and will continue to be one of
kind rather than of degree.
Perhaps the most significant of the traditional public and non-
public sources of international law in the development of the "of-
fenses against the law of nations" concept has been the influence of
history and national attitudes. It is quite obvious that certain ideas
and institutions, however needed and even conceived of at any given
time, will not become viable if the time is not ripe. Obviously, it
took Nazi bestiality to make the Genocide Convention possible. In
similar fashion, such historical forces sensitize international aware-
ness of particular problems, emphasize the need for the creation of
new, or the modification of old, offenses, and even help isolate
constituent elements of offenses. This view of the role of history
will be largely an implicit assumption of this contribution.
I. EMPHASIS ON CONTROL OF WAR AND PROTECTION
FOR INDIVIDUALS THROUGH STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(1892-1917)
Representing the last quarter-century of relative peace following
[Vol. 18:15721572
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the Napoleonic era, this period ended in the catastrophe of World
War I. Judging by the actions of contemporary statesmen, fearful
expectation of just such a disaster must have been a dominant atti-
tude. Because of this terrible foreboding, there existed a preoccupa-
tion with means to make more civilized the commencement and
conduct of warfare. The goal was the drafting and ratification of
relevant international conventions of which the Hague Conventions
and Declarations of 18991 and 19072 were the most notable.
It takes little more than a glance at the tides of these declara-
tions and conventions to enable one to evaluate the thinking and
practical accomplishments of the nations involved. The drafters
assumed that there would be future wars and that they would be-
come progressively more terrible if not controlled.' Therefore,
rules were adopted regarding such aspects as the limitation or pro-
hibition of the use of certain weapons, the conduct of land and
naval warfare, the determination of the qualifications of belliger-
ents, and the treatment of the sick and wounded.
This is not the place to discuss the degree of compliance with
the terms of these instruments by those ratifying them nor the ex-
tent to which they created new international law or were merely
declaratory of existing law and custom.4 From the viewpoint of
1 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of international Disputes, July 29, 1899,
32 Star. 1779 (1901), T.S. No. 392; Convention Governing the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (1902), T.S. No. 403; Convention for the
Adoption for Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Conference, July 29,
1899, 32 Star. 1827 (1901), T.S. No. 396; Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of
Throwing Explosives From Balloons, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser.
2) 994; Declaration Concerning the Use of Gas in War, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens
Nouveau Recuell (ser. 2) 998; Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of Bullets Which
Expand or Flatten, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002.
2 Among the fourteen conventions and declarations relevant to this subject adopted
at The Hague, October 18, 1907, are: Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277 (1910), T.S. No. 539; Convention Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2310
(1910), T.S. No. 540; Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time
of War, 36 Stat 2351 (1910), T.S. No. 542; Declaration Regarding the Prevention of
Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives From Balloons, 36 Stat. 2439 (1910), T.S. No.
546.
SThe introductory language of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2279 (1910), T.S. No. 539, 3
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461 stated: "Considering that, while seeking means
to preserve peace and prevent armed conflicts between nations, it is likewise necessary
to bear in mind the case where an appeal to arms may be brought about by events which
their solicitude could not avert...."
4 See the introductory language to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, which includes the following-
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
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defining offenses, the efforts at The Hague can be seen as an attempt
to control the methods of interstate warfare - long the central
problem of public international law. Toward the end of a century
of relative peace and just prior to the first demonstration that inter-
national war could threaten all civilization, it was not yet possible
to agree that any limitations upon the basic power of states to re-
sort to war should be imposed. The offenses defined at the Hague
Conferences meant merely that once war was chosen as the end of
national policy, the state was not completely free in the use of the
means. It took the lessons of two more world disasters to make
possible some official acts promoting the always-present idea that
most wars themselves should be made illegal.
For similar reasons, the time was not yet propitious to agree
upon (or perhaps even to widely conceive of) any offenses which
could be committed by a state against its own nationals. In addi-
tion, the concept of national sovereignty was then still in its most
undiluted form, preventing practical consideration of problems such
as how far "superior orders" and an "act of state" should be recog-
nized as defenses to allegations of breaches of the provisions of the
Hague instruments and the reserved principles of the law of nations.
Relevant to this theory of sovereignty was the assumption that only
states could be the significant actors in international law. For ex-
ample, Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention on Land Warr
reads:
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensa-
tion. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces.6
So long as the individual was not seen as having his own interna-
tional personality, offenses could not easily be defined as either giv-
ing him direct protection or imposing upon him direct responsi-
bility.
However, in certain limited areas the "law of nations" imposed
individual responsibility. While treaties may have played a part
at some time and in certain aspects in the development of the indi-
vidual responsibility concept, by 1892 the concept had passed into
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience. Id. at 2279-
80, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) at 464.
5Id. at 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) at 461.
6 Id. at 2290, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) at 479.
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customary international law. Thus, in spite of the language and
spirit of the Hague Conventions, the principle that individual sol-
diers could be criminally responsible for violations of the laws of
war and be tried by enemy authorities was recognized.T Also within
the individual responsibility category were such offenses as piracy
and trade in slaves and narcotics.8
However, then and perhaps to a lesser extent now, the written
and unwritten laws of war generally were applied to the individual
by means of municipal law.' Many criminal acts such as rape were,
of course, crimes whether committed in wartime or peacetime, and
the controlling municipal law applied equally during both periods.
However, the pressures of war also led to the creation of special
legislative, administrative, and case law, particularly in such areas
as internal security and economic crimes. Finally, wartime brought
into play that aspect of municipal law which combined interna-
tional and non-international elements - military codes and martial
law.
In addition to the crucial problems of definition involved in
war-related offenses, the area of state responsibility towards aliens
was sufficiently developed during this quarter-century to be of inter-
est as a basis of comparison with later evolution of the concept.
The source of these rules may have been, to some degree, the desire
of the strong powers to protect their citizens while abroad in weaker
states. Yet, as Jessup states, international law in this area has been
relatively successful in balancing conflicting interests."0 The rules
regarding state responsibility, discussed by Jessup, were probably
more effectively imposed by the leading western powers at the turn
of the century than is the case today. Jessup said:
Two rules are generally accepted as starting points in the ap-
proach to the determination of a state's responsibility for an in-
jury to an alien. The first of these is that the alien, by entering a
foreign country, subjects himself to the local law. The second rule
is that the state is not an insurer of the safety and lives of aliens.
Offsetting the first rule is the concept of the international stand-
ard which qualifies the supremacy of the local law, including law
administration, by asserting that the local law is not the last resort
if it falls below the standard in general or in its application to the
particular case.... The second rule is qualified by a set of sub-
sidiary rules stating the conditions under which the state is liable
7 FRIEDMANN, ThiE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 167 (1964).
8 Id. at 167, 246.
9 For a review of this area, see LACHs, WAR CaRmms 9-12 (1945).
10 JEssup, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONs 96 (1948).
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for an injury to an alien. In general, liability is predicated on
fault (culpa)."
More relevant than the examination of the specific content of
these rules is recognition of the concept that a state had certain
legal responsibilities toward aliens which produced certain rules,
the violation of which could be seen as offenses against the law of
nations. The specific application of these rules, then as now, sought
to protect the person and property of aliens. 2 It has probably always
been true that violation of the principles designed to protect the
alien's person as contrasted to those relating to the protection of his
property, could be more readily defined as offenses, and with the
increasing diversity of economic views and conceptions of property
since the 1892-1917 period, it has become even more difficult to
define property offenses.'3
Another impact of the rules of state responsibility was, inten-
tionally or not, to focus attention upon the individual. This en-
hanced individual international status even though, formally, the
alien had to act through, and at the sole discretion of, his national
state. It is probably impossible to accurately assess cause and effect
in the sphere of international institutions and ideas. However, in-
tuitively it seems that the theory and practice of state responsibility
to aliens must have contributed to the atmosphere necessary for
subsequent progress, not only in individual status but also in the
shift of perspective represented today by such enactments as the
United Nations Covenants and the European Convention 4 system
which seek to give the individual certain rights in international law
against his own state.
II. EMPHASIS ON INITIATING WAR AND PROTECTION
THROUGH INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY (1967)
The growth and change of meaning of "offenses against the
law of nations" has been most significant and progressively rapid
11 Id. at 103-04. (Footnotes omitted.) See also BORcHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC
PRoTECnIoN oF CITizENs ABROAD (1916).
12 Cf. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm. 162-202, U.N.
Doc. A/6546 (1966).
-3 For an example of these difficulties in relation to the expropriation of foreign
property, see Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
34 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 [hereinafter cited as European Convention].
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in the half-century between 1917 and 1967. A very basic ques-
tion, the role of the individual in international law, received much
attention and elicited important answers. This was crucial in de-
veloping the meaning of "offenses," since it was relevant to the
problem of against whom, and by whom, an "offense" may be com-
mitted.
After events such as the two world wars, Articles 227, 297, and
304 of the Versailles Treaty, 5 the Leipzig Trials,"8 Article 5 of
the German-Polish Convention for Upper Silesia, 7 the Nuremberg
Trial,'" several decisions of the World Court,19 and the European
Convention on Human Rights system;2" the individual's status in
international law has become more firm with regard to both rights
and duties.2 The two world-wide convulsions have shaken, if not
3. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, arts.
227,297, 304, June 28, 1919, in U.S. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND AFTER (1947).
Articles 297 and 304 authorized individual nationals of allied states to sue Germany
before mixed arbitral tribunals for damages resulting from Germany's use of extra-
ordinary war measures. Id. at 371, 547. Article 227 contemplated the trial of the
Kaiser for violating international morality and the sanctity of treaties. This was the
cornerstone for the modem practice of trial and punishment of individuals for viola-
tions of international law. Id. at 624.
16 Por comment concerning the Leipzig Trials of German World War I criminals
by the Supreme Court of the Reich, see GLUEcr, WAR CRIMINALS, THEIR PROSEcu-
TION AND PUNISHMENT (1944).
17 Erkl'rung der Deutschen und der Polnischen Regieruaig zu dem am 15.5.1922
in Genf geschlossenea Abkommen iUber Oberschleslen, unterzerchnet in Oppeln am
3.6.1922 (R.G.BI. ii, s. 165). See STONE, INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF MI-
NORIy RIGHTS (1932). Of particular interest is the right of individual petition and
how it developed before the Regional Commission and the League Council. Id. at
40-45.
Is Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal,
Nov. 4, 1945 through Oct. 1, 1946, I NuRHMBRG OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS (1947).
The tribunal's judgment appears in id. at 171-366.
19 At times the case of Jurisdiction of the European Comm'n of the Danube, [1927]
P.C.LJ., ser. B, No. 14, has been cited as enhancing the status of the individual in inter-
national law. See also Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4; Jurisdiction of the Courts of
Danzig, [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 15; Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees, [1923]
P.C.IJ., ser. B, No. 4.
2 0 European Convention, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, in force Sept. 3, 1953.
2 1 DROST, HIUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS - THE REALIZATION OF INDIVID-
UAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN POsITIVE INTERNATIONAL LAw - GENERAL DISCUSSION
AND TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS ON AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1965); GLASER, INTRODUCTION A L'VETUDE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PENAL
(1954); GLUECK, op. cit. suPra note 16; KATZ, GoVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE
INDVDUAL (1957); LAUTERPAcHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF
MAN (1945); NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1962); PoLITs, THE NEw ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1928); REMEC,
THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO GROTIUS
AND VATTEL (1960); Aufricht, Personality in International Law, 37 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
217 (1943); Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law With
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 530 (1943);
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yet toppled, the foundations of the state system known in the nine-
teenth century. The wars and their aftermaths have increased the
dimensions of state interdependence, have demonstrated the horrors
of unrestrained state sovereignty, and have been among the causes
of the creation of great numbers of new states not entirely bound
by Western European ideologies. All this has tended to weaken the
national state and the "classical" rule associated with it, which de-
clared that only states could be subjects of international law. The
various treaties, conventions, and decisions discussed are some indi-
cation of the individual's emergence to a fuller international per-
sonality and the corresponding relative decline of the former com-
pletely dominating actor, the national state.
Without question, the national state is still the primary inter-
national personality. However, regarding individual responsibility
for international offenses, Versailles, Leipzig, and Nuremberg tend
to strip away the protective shroud of the state and expose the indi-
vidual to responsibility. Similarly, the Upper Silesian Convention
and the European Convention on Human Rights, inter alia, in-
crease, directly or indirectly, the right, and more importantly, the
power of the individual to protect himself from offenses. Thus, in
1967, we are in the midst of a dramatic transition from the nine-
teenth-century regime minimizing the individual's international per-
sonality to an expanded concept of international justice in which
the individual can be both perpetrator and victim of international
offenses.
A convenient, though not entirely comprehensive, point from
which to observe the current content of "offenses against the law of
nations" is the Nuremberg Charter and the Nuremberg Tribunal's
scheme of "Crimes Against Humanity," "War Crimes," and "Crimes
Against Peace."
A. Crimes Against Humanity
Article 6(c) of the Charter which bound the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
mane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war; or persecution on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT L
L. 533 (1956).
['Vol. 18: 15721578
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the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.... 2
Most of these acts would be considered criminal under any system
of law. However, this definition seems to make the relatively new
category of "Crimes Against Humanity" somewhat unique because
of the implicit emphasis upon the commission of acts on a vast scale
and against groups. In other words, perhaps some acts within the
definition - for example, persecution on political grounds - may
not be criminal under municipal or international law when aimed
at an individual, but when addressed to a "civilian population" they
become an international crime.
This emphasis on the collective target was the natural reaction
against defeated Nazism and crumbling colonialism, a reaction
which has set the tone for almost all post-World War II activity
involving international offenses. Obviously, the Genocide Con-
vention," adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on De-
cember 9, 1948, is another product of this reaction. The Conven-
tion defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its phy-
sical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.2
Unlike Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, the Genocide Con-
vention does not mention political groups. However, it is broader
than Nuremberg in that the crime is dearly one that can be com-
mitted in time of peace or war.25 In addition the Nuremberg and
Genocide principles coincide in sweeping aside official, and even
ruling, status as a defense.
A development converse to the collectivization of the victim in
2 2 Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Star. 1544, 1547 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472, at 4, [hereinafter
cited as London Charter]. See also Wright, War Criminals, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257
(1945).
2 3 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, in force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
24 Id. at 280.
25 Ibid.
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these definitions has been the attempt of the London Charter and
Nuremberg Judgment to introduce a collective element into the
definition of "perpetrator" of the crime. Articles 9 and 10 of the
London Charter" authorize the Tribunal to declare "a group or or-
ganization" criminal and then to find individual members guilty of
crime because of membership in such a group or organization."
The judgment indicated that a criminal organization was similar to
a criminal conspiracy since both involve cooperation for a common
criminal purpose.28 A group was seen as a wider and more em-
bracing term than an organization, though the Tribunal imposed
certain limitations upon the concept of criminal organization and
group.
29
Perhaps the greatest pertinent controversy regarding the defini-
tions of the Nuremberg crimes has centered about the determina-
tion of the criminality of groups and organizations and the related
concept of conspiracy. The difficulty apparently arises because of
the relative unfamiliarity of non-common law legal systems with
the concept of conspiracy. Even though the criminality of organi-
zations was limited in the various substantial ways already indicated,
many have had doubts about it. Kelsen felt that it represented ret-
rogression to primitive notions of collective guilt.3" Kelsen's fear
is obviously well founded. Unless a limitation in addition to those
imposed by the Nuremberg Tribunal is added, namely, the restric-
tion of criminality to policymakers and leaders of criminal organiza-
tions, grave injustices could occur. It is noteworthy that on De-
cember 11, 1946, when the General Assembly unanimously adopted
a resolution affirming the principles of the Charter and Judgment
of the Nuremberg Tribunal, it omitted reference to the concept of
criminal organization.31 In addition, the concept of collective guilt
runs counter to the increasing trend toward the individualization of
26 London Charter, arts. 9, 10, 59 Stat. 1548, (1945) E.A.S. No. 472, at 5.
27 Ibid.
28 Judgment of the Tribunal, 1 NUREmBuRG O'FIciAL DOcumENTS 256 (1947).
29Those limitations were: (1) it must have been "formed or used in connection
with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter"; (2) membership must have
been, in general, voluntary and not as a result of conscription or physical pressure; (3)
the criminal purpose and activities of the organization must have been so widespread
and well known to members that it could be assumed that, in general, members were
aware of them; (4) the period of membership involved was limited to the duration of
the Second World War; and (5) it excluded certain sub-groups such as janitors and
menial laborers, who had no direct part in the criminal acts of the main group. Ibid.
30 Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremburg Trial Constitute a Precedent in
International Law?, 1 INT'L. L.Q. 153 (1947).
31 1 U.N. GAOR 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
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rights and responsibilities, and no convincing reason for the allow-
ance of such an exception has been presented.
Perhaps the most effective steps taken thus far in the twentieth
century toward defining "offenses against the law of nations" within
the general area of "Crimes Against Humanity" have been those in-
volved with the creation of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," its related
institutions, and subsequent protocols.
The Convention consists of a preamble and sixty-six articles
organized into five sections. The preamble refers to the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and resolves "to
take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the
Rights stated in the Universal Declaration.""3  Article 1 contains
the obligation of the parties to secure to everyone within their juris-
diction the rights and freedoms listed in section 2."
The section 1 rights and freedoms are generally those "classic"
civil and political rights which have become accepted in Western
Europe and the Western Hemisphere during the past two hundred
years.
85
Two subsequent protocols are germane to our purposes. The
first, signed in Paris on March 20, 1952, consists of six articles, of
which three are relevant. 6 The first article deals with property
rights and asserts that every national or legal person is entitled to
32 Nov. 4, 1950, in force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. By November 28,
1950, the following had signed the Convention: Belgium, Denmark, France, German
Federal Republic, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, The Saar, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. U.N. YEARBOOK ON Hu-
mAN RIGHTS FOR 1950, at 418 (1952).
83 European Convention, Preamble, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
84 Ibid.
3 5 They cover the following: right to life protected by law with certain public in-
terest limitations on this right (art. 2); punishment (art. 3); slavery and forced labor
(art. 4); liberty and security of the person except in certain listed cases and in accor-
dance with certain described procedures (art. 5); safeguards of a fair and public criminal
trial and procedure (art. 6); prohibition against retroactive criminal guilt with limited
exceptions (art. 7); respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence (art.
8); freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (art. 9); freedom of expression (art.
10); peaceful assembly and association (art. 11); marriage (art. 12); effective remedies
against violations of Convention rights even if the violator was acting in official capacity
(art 13); enjoyment of rights and freedoms without discrimination (art. 14); when dero-
gation from the rights and freedoms is permissible (art. 15); possible limitation on po-
litical rights of aliens (art. 16); rebuttal of implication to destroy any of the rights and
freedoms of the Convention (art. 17); and no restrictions for any purpose other than
those prescribed (art. 18). European Convention, arts. 2-18, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224-34.
80 For a convenient source of the text of the first Protocol see U.N. YEARBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1952, at 411-12 (1954). The Protocol was in force May 18,
1954.
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the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and that "no one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided by the law and by the general principles
of international law."8  Exceptions in the public interest are per-
mitted regarding taxes, penalties, and control of property use. The
second article deals with the right to education and provides a duty
to respect the rights of parents to educate their children in accor-
dance with their personal religious and philosophical convictions.
The third article provides for free elections at reasonable intervals
by secret ballot under circumstances ensuring free expression.
The fourth protocol consists of seven articles, the main purpose
of which is to add four new rights to those of section 1 of, as well
as protocol number I to, the European Convention. These four
are: (1) abolition of imprisonment for inability to fulfill a contrac-
tual debt; (2) freedom of movement and choice of residence within
the state, and freedom to leave any country subject to certain de-
fined public interest exceptions; (3) prohibition of expulsion from,
or denial of right of entry to, the territory of the state of which one
is a national; and (4) prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens."8
Generally more significant than the rights defined in the Con-
vention and in these protocols has been the relatively effective en-
forcement machinery provided by the Commission and the court,
analysis of which is not pertinent here.
The most pressing question concerning the European Conven-
tion system is how relevant are its definitions of rights with regard
to the problem of defining "offenses against the law of nations."
Can the violation of these rights be considered offenses? If so, can
they now, or will they in the future, be considered offenses against
the law of nations?
An attempt to answer these questions on a more general level
will be made later."9 Specifically, the broad range of the European
Convention rights makes some of them immediately relevant, and
some of only future relevance. Whether seen from the vantage
point of comparative law and "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations," of customary international law, or of widely
held moral principles, rights such as those designed to protect life,
outlaw slavery and forced labor, and ensure fair criminal trials are
basic enough to fit any reasonable designation of "offenses." How-
87 Id. at 411.
8 8 The text of the fourth Protocol, opened for signature in September of 1963, may
be found in ROBERTSON, HUMAN RiGHTs IN EtmoPE 265 (1963).
39 See text accompanying notes 48-56 infra.
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ever, when dealing with such rights as the protection of private
property, the area may be so heavily infused with cultural bias that
they are greatly reduced in their universal applicability.
Regarding the place of the European Convention rights in in-
ternational law, it should be noted that the revolutionary aspect
of the European Convention System is that it can protect a citizen
against violation of the defined rights by his own state within a
framework of international treaties and institutions. Thus while
the system is limited because of its regional nature, it represents a
dramatic and significant extension of international law in its pro-
tective aspects by inserting itself between the individual and his
state.40 Certainly for the member nations, violation of the Conven-
tion's rights can be said to constitute offenses against international
law. To the extent that the rights involved can be said to be uni-
versally recognized, their statement and effective enforcement by
these European states can only help strengthen the claim that these
rights must be the basis of general offenses against the law of na-
tions. Whether those rights which rest upon a more particularistic
basis will ripen into the basis of such offenses cannot now be pre-
dicted with any confidence, but they can be seen as a reference point
for future development.
Comparison with the long-debated and recently adopted United
Nations Covenants on Human Rights can assist in determining the
universality of the European Convention rights and illustrate an-
other possible source for the definition of offenses.' The first
4 0 The power of the Commission to hear petitions from "any person, non-govern-
mental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by
one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention," Euro-
pean Convention, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 236, depends on the deposit of a declara-
tion by a signatory that it will be bound by the provisions of article 25 in which the
cited language appears.
4 1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as an Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were adopted by the United,
Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966, after having been on the Assem-
bly's agenda since 1954. These covenants were adopted unanimously;, the Optional
Protocol was adopted by a vote of 66 for (including most western European countries
and the United States), 2 against (Niger and Togo) and several abstentions (including
the Soviet Union and all other communist states represented). 21 U.N. GAOR 27-30,
U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1496 (1966). For the language of the two Covenants and the Op-
tional Protocol, see 21 U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 162-202, U.N. Doc. A16546 (1966).
The Optional Protocol provides for a very mild procedure by which the Human Rights
Committee set up by the Covenant could receive certain limited communications from
individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the Covenants' rights. Its
powers would be limited to communicating to the state involved, receiving that state's
written explanations or statements, and then forwarding its views to.the state and indi-
vidual concerned.
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twenty-seven of the fifty-three articles of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights42 deal with substantive rights and the permissible
derogations of them 3
A comparison of the language of the European Convention with
the language of the Civil and Political Covenant reveals a very con-
siderable similarity of wording, scope, and subject matter. How-
ever, the United Nations Covenant is more detailed in certain
areas.44 It can therefore be said that, so far as the European Cove-
nants go, they do (in language at least, questions of meaning and
implementation aside) express universal ideas about basic civil and
political rights. The first protocol to the European Covenant, deal-
ing with private property, can indeed be seen as an exception. On
the other hand, the Civil and Political Covenant does have a stronger
emphasis upon curbing discrimination based upon any form of per-
sonal status.
In addition, Article 1 of both United Nations Covenants pro-
vides, in identical language, for the right of self-determination of
all peoples and for their freedom to dispose of their natural resources
"without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit,
and international law." This right represents a mixture of eco-
nomic and political concepts and becomes involved in international
polemics concerning expropriation. Logically, this involvement
does not make such a right any less likely to become the basis of an
offense against the law of nations. However, its insertion in the
United Nations Covenants was dearly the result of the desires of
the "underdeveloped nations" to protect their resources against "im-
perialistic nations." This desire was obviously not a strong factor
among the signatories of the European Covenant. Thus, for this and
other reasons, "self-determination" may be a less universal concept
42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N.
"GAOR, 3d Comm. U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966).
43These rights concern: self determination and local control of resources, enjoy-
ment of rights without discrimination; "the inherent right to life" and limitations on
the death penalty; torture and punishment; slavery and forced labor; liberty of person,
arrest, and detention; treatment of detained persons; abolition of imprisonment for
debt, freedom of movement within and between states; expulsion of aliens; criminal
procedure; ex post facto laws and punishment; recognition before the law; interference
with privacy, home, family, and correspondence; freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion; freedom of expression; war propaganda and advocacy of discrimination; peace-
ful assembly; freedom of association; family and marriage; protection of children; free-
dom to participate in public affairs and to have free elections; equality before the law,
and protection of minorities. Ibid.
44 See, e.g., ibid. (criminal procedure).
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than most other rights expressed in both the European and United
Nations Civil and Political Covenants.
Of the thirty-one articles of the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, ten describe the rights to be protected.45 The
concepts involved in this covenant are relatively imprecise and nec-
essarily difficult to measure or implement. In addition, it is quite
possible that there is a wider disparity of convictions and achieve-
ment regarding these rights than those expressed by the Civil and
Political Covenant. Therefore, it seems far less likely that the Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Covenant will be a feasible source for
the definition of offenses.
During the League of Nations era, the development of interna-
tional machinery to encourage economic and social cooperation was
attempted, but little was done to define human rights or to devise
effective means to promote them. However, the United Nations,
from its beginning, has consistently striven to define and promote a
broad range of human rights, though with variable results. The
Universal Declaration and the attempts to translate it into the treaty
law of international covenants probably held the spotlight. Ul-
timately it is quite likely that its work in other areas will have a
greater cumulative impact on the promotion of human rights.
Some idea of the more successful efforts of the United Nations
is given in General Assembly Resolution 2081 of December 20,
1965.40 After noting that a previous resolution ' had designated
1968 as the international year for human rights and asking mem-
ber states and various organizations to devote 1968 to intensified
efforts in the human rights area, the resolution invites all members
to ratify, before 1968, the human rights conventions already con-
cluded. The resolution called particular attention to conventions
dealing with the abolition of slavery, forced labor, discrimination
in employment, equal remuneration for men and women, freedom
of association and of the right to organize, discrimination in educa-
tion, genocide, political rights of women, and racial discrimination.
The same resolution urged the conclusion of the draft Covenants on
Civil, Political and Economic, Cultural and Social Rights just dis-
cussed, a covenant on the elimination of all forms of racial intoler-
45 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
21 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966). Including article 1 just men-
tioned, these rights deal with areas such as: the right to work; "social security"; family
and mothers; standard of living, education; and cultural life. Id.
40 GA. Res. 2081, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 44-45, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
47 G.A. Res. 1961, 18 U.N. GAOR Supi,. 15, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
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ance, a covenant on freedom of information, and a draft declaration
on the status of women so that such covenants could be open for
ratification and accession before 1968.48
In sum, United Nations human rights efforts have been divided
between comprehensive definitions of human rights in an Interna-
tional Bill translated into the form of two legally binding cove-
nants, on the one hand, and numerous separate covenants enlarging
upon some specific aspects of the comprehensive scheme (and add-
ing some others) on the other.
Compared to the European Convention on Human Rights this
United Nations activity has been on a far broader scale. However,
this does not necessarily mean that the United Nations definitions
of rights are so generally accepted as to be the basis of international
offenses. First, many have not yet been widely ratified. Second,
even though the two general United Nations Covenants are legally
binding on the states which ratify them, no effective enforcement
machinery is provided. Therefore, enforcement is left to the gen-
eral sanctions of international law regarding treaties, which can be
expected to be particularly ineffective here since the rights largely
involve the relationship between the signatory state and its own
subjects. Due to the omission of effective international enforce-
ment machinery, the United Nations efforts were not subject to the
discipline imposed upon the drafters of the European Convention
Protocols by the European Convention's enforcement system of
Commission, Court, and Executive Organ. This could very well
have been responsible for the very broad range of subjects covered
and for the frequently idealistically sweeping language employed
by the United Nations.
Furthermore, with regard to the rights presented by the Euro-
pean Convention and, a fortiori, the United Nations efforts, there
is a logical (and probably a practical political) gap between the rec-
ognition of certain rights, and the willingness to consider them as
being so basic to international order as to deem violation of them
"offenses against the law of nations." In any event, both the Euro-
pean Convention system and United Nations work in the human
rights field can be seen as sources from which the definition of of-
4 8 Other human rights areas dealt with by the United Nations include: refugees
and stateless persons, minorities, children, the right of asylum, apartheid, rights and
duties of states including the right of diplomatic intervention, false and distorted news
reports, consent to and minimum age of marriage, prisoners of war, and political pris-
oners.
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fenses can be derived when and if that logical and practical gap is
bridged.
In addition to the experience of Nuremberg and its related
events and the work of the United Nations, the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War49
is another significant point from which to assess our current posi-
tion in the definition of offenses in the "Crimes Against Humanity"
classification. As Greenspan states:
World War J1 brought to a head the need to regulate by law the
treatment of civilian populations in time of war. The ruthless ap-
plication of the doctrine of total war by the Axis powers inflicted
vast losses and suffering on the civilian populations of powers
against which they waged war. Heightening this cosmic tragedy
were the devilish theories of race superiority which demanded the
extermination of whole groups of civilian populations .... Such
shocking crimes compelled the attention of international lawyers
to the necessity for creating a comprehensive body of law to deal
with such evils, which had hitherto been accorded cursory treat-
ment in a few articles of the Hague Regulations. It is now real-
ized that the laws of war should concern themselves as much with
the civilian populations involved as with the armed forces con-
ducting the hostilities.5 0
The Convention applies to armed conflicts with or without a
formal declaration of war, to all cases of partial or total occupation
of a party, and to all signatories to the Convention in their mutual
relations, even if they are also engaged in conflict with a non-signa-
tory.5' Certain stated minimum rules of conduct bind a party even
in case of civil wars within the territory of a party.' Essentially,
persons protected by the Convention are those who, in case of con-
flict or occupation, are "in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."5  The Con-
vention specifies rights of protected persons and restraints upon con-
flicting states in great detail. Article 27 contains the crux of the
matter by providing:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for
their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious con-
victions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall
4 9 Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, in
force Feb. 2, 1956.
50 GREENsPAN, THE MODERN LAw OF LAND WARFARE 154 (1959).
51 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art 2, Aug. 12, 1949, [19553 3 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 57 U.N.
T.S. 287, 288, in force Feb. 2, 1956.
52 Id. art. 3, [1955] 3 U.S.T. at 3518, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
53 Id. art. 4, [1955) 3 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
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at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially
against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults
and public curiosity....
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of
health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the
same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power
they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on
race, religion or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of
control and security in regard to protected persons as may be
necessary as a result of the war.54
This Convention brings the Hague system of 18995' and 190756
into step with the lessons taught by intervening history. However,
it is based upon the identical assumption that there will be more
wars and that therefore they should be humanized as much as pos-
sible. The irrelevance of most of the Convention to atomic war is
obvious. However, we have had since 1949 and, unfortunately,
will probably continue to have, non-atomic international and civil
wars for which the Convention will be relevant. In addition, the
rights and duties so extensively defined in the Convention clarify
and expand the concept of international offenses regarding treat-
ment of civilians in wartime.
B. Crimes Against Peace
A second Nuremberg category of crimes, "Crimes Against
Peace," represents an attempt to change or at least supplement the
assumption underlying the Hague57 and Geneva Conventions."
The resort to certain kinds of war was itself to be made illegal, not
just the inhumane waging of war. Article 6(a) of the London
Charter59 reads: "Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, prepara-
54 Id. art. 27, [1955] 3 U.S.T. at 3536, 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 306.
55 Hague Convention on the Settlement of International Disputes, July 20, 1899, 32
Stat. 1779 (1901), T.S. No. 392; Hague Convention on Maritime Warfare, July 20,
1899, 32 Stat. 1827 (1901), T.S. No. 396; Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of
War on Land, July 20, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (1902), T.S. No. 403.56 Conventions on Naval Warfare, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351-2439 (1910), T.S.
Nos. 542-46; Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2199 (1910), T.S. No. 536; Conventions on Land War, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277-2310 (1910), T.S. Nos, 539-40; Convention on the Opening of Hostilities,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259 (1910), T.S. No. 538; Convention on Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332 (1910), T.S. No. 541; Convention on the Employ-
meat of Force for the Collection of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241 (1910),
T.S. No. 537; Convention on the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives From Balloons,
Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439 (1910), T.S. No. 546.
57 See material cited notes 1-2 supra.
58 See Conventions cited notes 71-72 infra.
59 London Charter, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547 (1945), E.A.S. No.
412, at 4.
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tion, initiation or waging, of a war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participa-
tion in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing."6
A brief survey is not the place to attempt an exposition of the
meaning of this momentous definition as interpreted by the Nurem-
berg and subsequent post-World War J1 war crimes tribunals, by
the great number of commentators, or by United Nations bodies.61
Stone has sketched the historical background of the Nuremberg
definition as it relates to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the League, and
the United Nations system in remarkably precise language which
requires little further comment.'2  Nevertheless, a discussion of
some lessons of the past and problems of today involving resort
to war may be useful.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact6 failed to prevent war not only be-
cause it was violated but also because, in spite of its seemingly all-
inclusive language, it left many loopholes and room for argument.
For example, the right of "self-defense" remained; war could argu-
ably still be waged against non-signatories, and war to enforce in-
ternational obligations was arguably permitted. These and other
gaps existed in the face of such phrases as: the parties condemn "re-
course to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another";6" and "the settlement or solution of all disputes
or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be,
60 Ibid.
6 1 DRosT, THE CRIME OF STATE BOOK II GENOCIDE (1959); HARRIs, TYRANNY
ON TRIAL - THnE EVIDENCE AT NuRmBERG (1954); JACKSON, TE CASE AGAINST
THE NAZI WAR CRmnNALs (1946); MAUGHAM, U.N.O. AND WAR Ca, mS (1951);
WOETzEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1960); Aroneau,
Les Droits de L'Homme et le Crime Contre L'Humanitg, 25 REVUE DE DRIOT INTER-
NATIONALE DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUS ET POLITIQUES (A. Sottile) 187 (1947);
Biddle, Le Proc&s de Nuremberg, 19 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DBE DROIT P6NAL
1 (1948); Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War Criminals and In-
ternational Law, 43 AM. J. INT'L L 223 (1949); Leventhal, The Nuremberg Verdict,
60 HARV. L REV. 857 (1947); Schwelb, Crimes Against Huaanity, 23 THE BRIT-
ISH YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 178 (1946); Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 CoLtm.
L REV. 488 (1955); Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM.
J. NT'L L 405 (1948).
62 STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CoNFLICr 297-304, 331-33 (2d
ed. 1959). See also SHOTWELL, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY AND
ITS RENUNCIATION IN THE PACT OF PAWES (1929).
6 3 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat 2343 (1928), T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, ratified July 25,
1929.
64 Id. art 1, 46 Stat. at 2345-46, T.S. No. 796,94 LN.T.S. at 63.
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which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pa-
cific means." 5
In 1947, the General Assembly requested the International Law
Commission to formulate the principles of international law recog-
nized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and to prepare a draft code of Offenses Against the Peace and Se-
curity of Mankind indicating the place of the Nuremberg Principles
therein.66 This attempt to draft such a code has been notably un-
successful. It has foundered on the problem of whether to give a
general or an enumerated definition. The enumerated approach
was abandoned because of the difficulty of ever being sufficiently
comprehensive and the undesirability of limiting in advance any fu-
ture enforcement organ. However, little success has also been ob-
tained with a general definition.'
The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Draft Code of Offenses" ex-
periences can justify several conclusions. First, it seems rather
naive to expect that the desire to make resort to war an offense can
be greatly assisted by the codification approach. This opinion is
hopefully not determined by common law training alone, but by
the recognition that the core issues are too all-encompassing, too
little understood, and too enmeshed in basic political passions to be
susceptible of simple legalistic categorization. Second, given such
passions, such complexity, and the absence of effective international
enforcement machinery, the desire to evade even the most perfectly
drawn definition of the offense of illegal war in situations of self-
perceived need will be overwhelming. Therefore, will it not breed
disrespect for laws to define a crime with no reasonable prospect
that it will significantly control the conduct of those purportedly
subject to the definition?
On a more specific level, the key difficulty involved in attempt-
ing to define an offense of "Crimes Against Peace" or "illegal re-
sort to war" is the meaning of "war" and "aggression." While the
logical imperatives of the atomic age could support a definition
which outlawed all resort to violence with no conceivable exception,
65 Id. art. 2, 46 Stat at 2346, T.S. No. 796,94 L.N.T.S. at 63.
66 Formulation of the Principles Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, G.A. Res. 177, 2 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at
111-12, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947). For the text of the original Draft Code, see Interna-
tional Law Comm'n, Report, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 10-14, U.N. Doc. A/1858
(1951).
67 STONE, op. cit. supra note 62, at 334.
68 International Law Comm'n, Report, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 10-14, U.N.
Doc. A/1858 (1951).
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the political facts of international society render such an effort fu-
tile. It is not presently possible to take from the national state the
right of self-defense, nor from the international community the
right to employ violence to suppress a breach of the peace.
Therefore, it is not prohibition of the use of all violence, but
mainly of aggressive violence, which has been the goal.69 Thus,
the issues raised here include: Can the definition of war and aggres-
sion be objective, or must the intent of the actor be considered?
Can key definitions have any lasting meaning when they will prob-
ably be used defensively by the successful user of violence regardless
of whether he was in fact the "aggressor"? How can there be estab-
lished an impartial international enforcement or interpretive body
to avoid the use of the offense in a purely might-makes-right man-
ner? How far down the policy-making hierarchy can one go in
imposing individual liability for commission of the offense of ag-
gressive war? What should be the place of nulla poena sine lege
once it is assumed that not all kinds of undesired violence can be
dearly prohibited in advance? How far can the nation-state remain
free to determine the "self-defense" character of its resort to violence
before any attempt to define it is vitiated? An attempt to deal with
some of these questions will be made in the final section of this
paper.
C War Crimes
[TIhe liberty of States to resort to war under customary interna-
tional law is still a substantial liberty. With it there survives the
continued importance in international law of the principles gov-
erning the conduct of belligerent States inter se, and of belliger-
ents and neutral States and traders vis-a-vis each other.70
The first source of the modem written law of war is, of course,
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions dealing with treatment of the
Sick and Wounded on Land, or at Sea, Prisoners of War, and Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War.7' Space allows only a few general
69 For an excellent review of the problems of definition of war and aggression, see
SToNB, op. cit. supra note 62, at 304-06.
70 Id. at 303-04.
7 1 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
15 U.N.T.S. 31, in force Feb. 2, 1956; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; Aug. 12,
1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, T.ILAS. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, in force Feb. 2, 1956;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3
U.S.T. 3316, T.LA.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, in force Feb. 2, 1956; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, in force Feb. 2, 1956.
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comments about these Conventions.!' They represented an attempt
to fill some gaps in prior conventions primarily revealed by the
horrors of World War II and the international "incidents" of the
1930,S.
73
The responsibility of the individual for commission of war
crimes, a principle of international customary law for many years,
was made quite explicit by the Convention on the Sick and Wounded
in the Field. 4  Provision is made for the transfer of such persons
to another contracting party for trial75
The four Geneva Conventions in general, and the language just
quoted in the footnotes in particular, illustrate the organic growth
of the definition of offenses. As already noted, at the time of the
1907 Hague Conventions, individual responsibility for war crimes
was accepted. However, the principle was apparently of neither
sufficient strength nor timeliness to be incorporated expressly in the
Hague Conventions. The heinousness of the war crimes of World
War II contributed to the pressures for clear recognition of indi-
vidual responsibility which resulted in the Nuremberg Charter defi-
nition of War Crimes and the similar language of Article 50 of the
Geneva "Wounded and Sick" Convention. 8
7 2 For a comprehensive treatment of the Conventions, see GREENSPAN, op. cit.
supra note 50, at 67-194. Greenspan does not cover the Maritime Convention. Stone's
treatment is more analytical. STONE, op. cit. supra note 62, at 651-92.
78 Examples are: the addition of language to Article 12 of the Convention on
Wounded and Sick in the Field, specifically prohibiting "biological experiments"; the
broadening of the definition of Protected Persons in the Prisoner of War Convention
to include members of resistance movements and the application of the latter Conven-
tion to many more conflict situations than were covered by the 1929 Geneva Conven-
tion on Prisoners of War which had been limited to international war. Convention
on Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Star. 2021 (1929), T.S. No. 846, 118 LN.T.S
343; cf. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
74 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31, in force Oct. 21, 1950. "Each High Contracting Party shall be under
the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their na-
tionality, before its own courts." Id. art. 49, [1955] 3 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at
62.
7 5 Article 50 defines such grave breaches as
[Alny of the following acts, if committed against persons or property pro-
tected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, in-
cluding biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wan-
tonly. Id. art 50, [1955) 3 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62.
76 Article 6(b) of the London Charter of August 8, 1945, defined war crimes as
violations of the laws and customs of war, which,
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
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Ill. EMPHASIS ON EXPANDED DEFINITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL OFFENSES AND EXPANDED
LOCAL AND REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT (1968-1992)
Roscoe Pound has posed questions fundamental to assessing the
potential of efforts to develop universally acceptable definitions of
"offenses against the law of nations." He asked:
Can we find how to secure universal ideals of right and justice
without, as a first step, setting up an omni-competent, universal,
political organization of mankind? Are there individual claims to
life and liberty, so general as to be substantially universally recog-
nized and so possible to be secured by an international process of
law? Does not the history of civilization teach us that there
are . . . ? The common law as the legal order of the English-
speaking world has no one politically organized society behind it.
The Civil or modem Roman law, which long was and still is to
no small extent the legal system of a great part of the world, has
had no unified political organization behind it .... It has been
assumed that to have a world law we must have a world state;
that universal political organization must come before universal
law. May it not be rather that universal law must precede the
universal state which will undertake to put any required force be-
hind it? 77
While not necessarily agreeing with Pound's conclusion, the
question "law or order first," is quite basic. Much depends upon
definitions of the terms involved. If by "law" is meant normative
principles explicitly consented to by official public authority, re-
gardless of the empirical effect that they have on conduct, then we
may be deceived into believing that "universal law" has been or can
be achieved without preceding "universal order." The grim fate of
the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War" during World
War H_ when the conditions of war underwent such drastic changes
illustrates how superficial such "law" can be."9
On the other hand, regardless of formality or explicitness of
recognition, it is conceivable that "law" can be both normatively
and empirically effective among politically independent entities.
Pound's example of Common and Roman Law, within their respec-
slave labor, or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
London Charter, art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat 1544, 1547 (1945), E.A.S.
No. 472, at 4.
77 Pound, Foreword to KuTNER, WORLD HABEAS CoRpus at v, vi, vii (1962).
78 July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021 (1929), T.S. No. 846, 118 LN.T.S. 343.
79 See STONE, op. cit. supra note 62, at 652-53.
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tive spheres, 0 is sound once one assumes the basic similarity of ideas
and institutions (if not unity or organization) within each. Since
there has not yet been universal political order, any progress thus
far made in developing effective definitions must have been based
upon some consensus concerning the need for, and intellectual con-
tent of, the legal controls represented by the definitions. The rela-
tive scarcity of such consensus has prevented more than a small
number of offenses from achieving effective universality.
Perhaps the analogy of a coral reef, with its progressive growth
by accumulation of numerous organisms, can help to guide specu-
lation about the future growth of the definition of offenses. Thus
far, only a tiny number of the marine zoophytes have sufficiently
hardened and have been pushed above the water's surface to ef-
fective visibility. Some of these organisms are relatively senile
and belong to species such as "piracy" and "trade in narcotics and
slaves." Others have a more significant geneology with closer ties
to the present, such as "state responsibility to aliens." There are
also those well-known but controversial types called "war crimes"
which have been above the surface for quite some time but are of
widely varying shapes, colors, and potency.
Just below the surface are those which have become enmeshed
in the structure of the reef but have not as yet reached the surface
of universal visibility. These include "Crimes against the Peace"
and "Crimes against Humanity" which have been troubled by amor-
phism, as well as the "European Convention Violations" which have
been important, though confined to but one portion of the reef.
There are those species which have been living in the reef but
which have not yet calcified into a permanent connection with it
These range from the "International Covenants on Civil and Po-
litical Rights" through the "Genocide Convention" to the "Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination" and the "Draft Treaties on Freedom of Informa-
tion."
Finally, there are those animals which have been living near
the reef and which may add their substance to it, but which are
still free swimming. These are called violations of "general
principles of law," "moral and political philosophy," "natural law,"
or "social custom." Which of these organisms will prosper and
emerge from the depths depends upon many factors, including the
amiability of the environment and the position and type of prede-
80 Pound, sapra note 77.
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cessors which have calcified into the reef and upon whose remains
future growth must build.
This analogy may lead to some specific comments on the cen-
tral problem of this contribution. First, "international offenses,"
like the coral reef, grow organically, based upon prior development.
The ties between the Nuremberg Judgment and the subsequent
Genocide Convention, and between the relatively cautious and ef-
fective work of the European Commission on Human Rights and
the subsequent creation of the European Court of Human Rights,
are examples of such growth. Acceptance of the reality of organic
growth should carry with it appreciation of a gradualistic approach
to the development of the concept of offenses (to the extent that
they are subject to conscious control at all). It was preferable to
make acceptance of the European Court of Human Rights depend
on a voluntary and separate act apart from ratification of the Euro-
pean Convention itself so that the first moves could be taken and
given a chance to prove themselves."1
Second, ideas, like marine organisms, will not flourish unless
the environment is friendly. The idea that those who determine
the use of violence on the world scene should be subject to certain
limitations has long been involved with religious thought and insti-
tutions, and with thinkers like Grotius and Suarez. However, no
meaningful steps to implement these thoughts took place until war
became a dear threat to all civilization and until there existed a
relatively comprehensive forum for discussion of the problem. In
brief, the store of truly original ideas is quite limited, and progress
depends upon their fortunate combination and historical "ripeness."
What combination of ideas will be able to emerge in the next
quarter-century regarding international offenses? It is likely that
the trend of the last seventy-five years to increase the number and
types of situations encompassed by the term "offense" will continue.
For example, "war crimes" was broadened by one of the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions" to include more detailed provisions regarding
mistreatment of civilian populations. In futuro, regardless of the
debate upon the legality and precedent value of the Nuremberg
Judgment, the United Nations' efforts to draft a code of offenses
81 One authority, Bilder, is sympathetic to this approach. He advocates a flexible
attitude towards human rights problems which would allow adherence to any human
rights solution on a limited basis (hopefully to be enlarged) with liberal use of proto-
cols, reservations, and optional clauses. He also favors the use of incentives as well as
sanctions to promote human rights. See Bilder, The International Promotion of Hu-
mao Rights: A Current Assessment, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1964).
82See Conventions cited note 71 supra.
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against the peace and security of mankind indicates some acceptance
of the idea that "aggressive war" is the ultimate international of-
fense. Whether such a code will ever be widely adopted or not,
and regardless of its effectiveness even if so adopted, it will become
increasingly difficult to assert freedom from some form of organized
international judgment when force is used in international affairs.
The similarity in definition of those rights found in the Euro-
pean Covenant and the United Nations Civil and Political Cove-
nant indicate that, on the verbal level at least, agreement upon the
existence of certain basic human rights is possible. It is obvious
that meanings of even clearly phrased rights can vary widely de-
pending upon the motivation and background of the interpreter.
In addition, methods used to enforce these rights are crucial to their
real importance. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the longer
the international community lives with even the verbal identity of
such rights formulations, the easier it will become to claim that dis-
regard of them constitutes an international offense. This type of
"offense" should be considered international even if just on a com-
parative basis the definitions can be classified as general principles
of law recognized by most nations. In addition, they should be so
classified because they will have their origin in international conven-
tions with at least some international enforcement, even if merely
by reports and communication of views among nations and with an
international organization.
Finally, relevant to the broadening of the content of "offenses,"
it seems quite possible that certain dearly "'sub-universal" concepts
will gain support and become raw material for new international
offenses."3 Likely prospects are in the economic area and may very
well focus on problems like control of resources and manipulation
of markets in basic commodities upon which the survival of whole
societies can depend. The results of another political or economic
upheaval such as have been all too frequent in the last seventy-five
years could, of course, give impetus to areas as unforseeable now as
genocide was not long before World War If.
Regarding the formal sources of development of definitions,
the role of conventions and declarations will probably increase.
International law and affairs are somewhat subject to phases of in-
83 It has been an obvious assumption of this article that a right or value must gain
more than local acceptance before its violation can be the basis of an international of-
fense. It may be inherently fruitless and certainly beyond the scope of this contribu-
tion to delve into questions such as what constitutes sufficient acceptance and in what
form must it be expressed before a right can be said to be "universal."
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terest. World War I was followed by increased interest in protec-
tion of minorities. World War II naturally produced the intensive
efforts to define and enhance human rights described in the second
section of this paper. This broadened international interest in hu-
man rights is likely to continue for the next twenty-five years, and
along with it will go a more frequent use of regional and universal
conventions and declarations to embody any agreements that may
be reached. This tendency will vary directly with the degree of
international peace. Preoccupation with individual and group sur-
vival in an atomic era is not conducive to the development of new
definitions of offenses, and it puts a hard-to-resist strain on the pos-
sibilities of respecting those already existing.
The prospects for the increased importance of international tri-
bunals in the growth of the concept of offenses do not appear too
bright. The International Court of Justice is not likely to be given
much more of an opportunity than it has had in the past to decide
basic human rights questions. If. the European Court on Human
Rights84 becomes a viable institution, it could act as a catalyst for
the development of similar courts in other regions. It may very
well be that municipal courts will become the principal judicial
creative force in the area. If regional organizations like the Euro-
pean Convention System grow, and if basic international human
rights documents like the United Nations Covenants become widely
adopted, there will be in effect in many nations a comprehensive
list of internationally recognized basic rights. These rights must
first be protected within municipal legal systems since it is not likely
that the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies will be relinquished
in the near future.
If attention to definition and refinement of basic rights con-
tinues to be high, the role of "publicists" in this area should become
increasingly significant. An intuitive assumption of this contribu-
tion has been that the major developments in the definition of of-
fenses have been largely predetermined by relevant historical events
and attitudes. The fear of impending war was probably the main
factor in the calling of, and in the results of, the Hague Conferences
of 1899 and 1907. The vogue of "self-determination" and its in-
complete implementation by the post-World War I settlements pro-
duced great interest in the protection of minorities during the inter-
84 The European Court on Human Rights came into effect on September 3, 1958,
with the deposit of the eighth declaration pursuant to Article 46 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 6 EUROPEAN YEARBoO, 1958, at 227.
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war years. Once this bow to "historical determinism" has been
made, it should be recognized that there is, of course, room for con-
scious creative effort by statesmen, lawyers, writers and other leaders
of thought. This area of influence will vary directly with the rate
of change in the concept of "offenses" since this should increase
susceptibility to informed suggestion.
If publicists desire to maximize their influence in the interna-
tional arena they should adopt a conscious "deculturalization" atti-
tude. In addition to following the general rules of dear thinking
such as examination of conscious assumptions, great effort should
be made to discover and weigh unconscious guiding principles. The
particularly dangerous ideas which too often determine the output
of too many writers are those which are unstated and culturally ac-
ceptable at any given time. Whether the sanctions for not accept-
ing these assumptions be moral, economic, physical, or otherwise,
the attempt must be made to resist automatic surrender to them or
else the result will be exercises in academic justification of the cul-
turally expedient.
It is easier to laud martyrdom than to live it. However, does it
take a martyr, particularly in a relatively "free" society, to criticize
his nation's dear violation of the basic rights of his fellow citizens
or of foreigners just because many of his fellow citizens raise no
protest? How refreshing and conducive to the development of an
international consensus it is when a scholar honestly attacks what
he thinks is his own nation's dogmatic viewpoint on an issue rela-
tive to an international offense. In short, to avoid academic ration-
alization of national expediency, and to prevent unnecessary schol-
arly support for atomistic hardening of conflicting positions, the
international publicist should place the burden of proof on the as-
sumptions of his own culture. In this way the controlling historical
mood can best be taken advantage of and possibly even diverted
somewhat to desired goals.
In sum, since 1892 we have seen a great broadening and deep-
ening of the traditional concept of international offenses. We now
have the Nuremberg triad of "Crimes Against Peace," "War
Crimes," and "Crimes Against Humanity" and the continuous filling
in of each of these categories. In addition, there are the movements
to define universal basic economic, political, social, and cultural
rights. Some guesses at future development of these concepts both
in content and source have been attempted. Is there a generalized
definition of "offenses against the law of nations" which may be
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useful as a bridge between the present and the future? The definition
should be broader than the usual connotation of the word "crime."
It should also not be so comprehensive as to include transient and
non-universal fads. A suggested definition of an offense against
the law of nations is: any violation of an elemental individual,
group, national or international value so basic and permanent in
importance that the necessity for its protection is recognized by most
of the recognized actors on the world scene.
